

**ADVANCED PROGRAM IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
UPPSALA UNIVERSITY**

**REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTRA-INTER STATE CONFLICTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY**

**Soraya Castro Marino
Angelie Agustin
Aswini Mohapatra
Nayef Abu Khalaf
Catalina Rojas**

May 1999

INTRODUCTION

The majority of Inter and Intra State conflicts have implications for regional stability. In general, regional stability is expected to bring with it more cooperation than conflict. Likewise, the end of the global confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was expected to provide peaceful and collaborative world order. However, a number of major and local and regional conflicts have still persisted despite the end of the Cold War or were actually unleashed after 1989, when the superpowers reduced their involvement in local and regional affairs. It is for this reason that this particular study has been chosen and considered relevant and important.

In this essay, the group has examined the regional dimensions of inter and intra state conflicts by making a comparative analysis of some of the conflicts in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia, as well as its effect with respect to regional stability. In considering the specific cases, the group has chosen to focus on three main issues/questions: How inter and intra state conflicts become regional conflicts? What are the changes in the nature of conflicts as a result of the end of the Cold War? What are the changes in the notion of regional security as a result of the end of the bipolar tensions?

For this paper, regional conflict means violent or potentially violent disputes, that have the potential to escalate and generate sustained violence, whose origins can be from intra or inter state conflicts, and where armed violence takes places or threatens to take place and has important implications for regional stability.

Conflict Resolution is far from easy but we say that the lessons learned in this study are relevant in understanding specific cases of inter and intra state conflicts as well as regional conflicts in general. In sum, the insights developed are offered as an small contribution to the Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution in the search for a better understanding of each particular conflict in this essay, which could gives some keys to other cases of conflict in the World.

The end of the Cold War refocused the security debate away from the more conventional security issues which have concerned governments and others for more than a century toward other issues perceived to be threat to security. For many the conventional narrow, military-political views have been jettisoned in favor of a less restricted protean view about a more complex and diffused world. Thus, the concept of security at the end of the twentieth century must take into consideration a regional perspective to explain the continuities and disruptions that are present in current international relations.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a spurt of academic literature on “region” and regional conflict. Many scholars even argue that the termination of bipolar international system has brought about a “renaissance” of region while increasing the scope of action for any potential hegemony a particular region may house. Commenting on the dramatic post-cold War changes, an American analyst has observed, rather than hegemony, the current asystem may be more likely to devolve into regionalization, as regional sub-system becomes increasingly autonomous from global forces. (Kaufman: 1997; 201-202)

Interestingly, however, the attempts to define and delineate the region scientifically have produced little result. For the concept of region is a flexible one and much depends on how actors perceive and interpret a region and the “regions”. In a way, all regions are socially constructed and politically contested. According to Andrew Hurrell, “ all regions are to some extent subjectively defined and can be understood in terms of what E. Adler has termed ‘cognitive region’. As with the nation, so region can be seen as an imagined community, which rest on mental map”. (Hurrell: 1997; 38-39)

All the same, one can identify at least three basic characteristics of a regional sub-system, which include,

- geographical proximity,
- internal and external recognition of a group of states as a distinctive area,
- regularity and intensity of interaction between actors to the extent that changes in one part affects other parts of the sub-system (Vayrynen: 1984)

Of the three, it is the intensity of conflictual relations-not the cooperative interaction-among the actors that constitutes the basis of regional sub-system in the Third World.¹ Based on this premise, Barry Buzan has used the term “security complex” to describe region or regional sub-system. According to the author, “security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”. (Buzan: 1991, 190)

The concept of security complex² helps us in explaining regional sub-system in terms of the patterns of amity and enmity, which range from genuine friendship and complete trust via indifference to suspicions, fear or hatred in the region. In defining regional security, the principal element to “power relation is the pattern of amity and enmity among states that are substantially confined within some particular geographical area”. (Buzan: 1991, p 189)

¹ It is important to point out that any valid measurement of intensity of interaction must include cooperation, competition and conflict. Barry Buzans’ earlier formulation of the concept of ‘regional security complex’ was based on the interdependence of rivalry rather than on the interdependence of shared interests, which he corrected in the later edition.

² Regional Security concept is rather a vague and contested term that depends on when it is defined, who defines it, what is it that is to be made secure, what is the scope of the notion of security, who sets the security agenda and why.

The historical dynamics of amity and enmity is less related to the global balance of power than the regional distribution of political, economic and military power. By adding the dimension of amity/enmity to the analysis, it is clearer to understand the relational patterns and character of insecurity. (Buzan: 1991, p190) This pattern of amity and enmity constitutes the first component of essential structure in a security complex.³ It arises from variety issues, which are as follows:

- 1) Historical links border and territorial disputes,
- 2) Border and territorial disputes,
- 3) Interest in ethnically related population
- 4) Ideological alignments
- 5) Socio-economic factors

We have chosen to make use of the above five variables for our case studies, which include two intra-state conflicts (the Kurds and Colombia) and three inter-state conflicts (the Arab-Israeli, the Philippines and Cuba-U.S.). The intra-state conflicts are closely linked to the process of state formation or what Ayoob calls, state making process (Ayoob: 1995; 50). In most Third World states, they are the products of the "weak state" based on low infrastructure power,⁴ which increases the state's high vulnerability. In many cases, intra-state conflicts are intertwined with the inter-state conflicts partly because of the spatial distribution of the ethnically- related population and the creation of artificial boundaries (the Kurds) and partly due to transnational links of the local actors and its implications on neighboring countries states (Colombia). Thus, these two conflicts, though have their roots in the domestic arena (i.e. state creation in the case of the Kurds and regime legitimacy in the Colombian case) affect the stability and security of their respective regions significantly.

Three other case studies fall under a different category since these inter-state conflicts are the results of the autonomous regional dynamic, which refers to the regional distribution of power, especially to the dominant regional power's attempts to preserve the favorable status quo as in the case of Cuba vis-à-vis the U. S., the Philippines vis-à-vis the PRC and the Middle East. In the latter case, the Zionist State is confronted with the Arab challenges to alter the prevailing balance of power in the region, threatening thereby its own territorial security.

On the whole, the inter-state conflicts underline the preeminent role that regional powers can play in precipitating and also containing conflicts. In the case of Cuba, in particular, the regional power happens to be the U. S., the lone global power. So is the case with the Philippines, which faces a formidable regional opponent contesting its territorial sovereignty in the China Sea.

In the concluding part of the essay, we make an attempt to analyze the emerging patterns of regional conflicts in the light of the recent dramatic changes at the system level. For the state security continues to be the top priority of the elite in much of the Third World at a time when states experience a progressive shrinkage of sovereignty.

³ The second key component of essential structure in as ecurity complex is the distribution of power.

⁴ Infrastructural power has been defined by Mann as "the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm." (Mann:1986, 112-114)

Additionally, "the changing global landscape has allowed new agendas to emerge which relates to other sectors, such as migration, drugs, control of diseases, environmental, arms transfer, terrorism, human rights, democracy etc". (Graham and Paku: 1991; 141)

The preeminent powers in post-Cold War era have either assumed the hegemonic roles or trying to sustain their regional domination over a relatively long period of time. For instance, the overwhelmingly powerful presence of the U. S. in the Central America has deprived the region of its own autonomy. External penetration has led to a situation in the region similar to what Buzan describes as *overlay*, which in varying degrees tend to complicate both intra and the inter-state conflicts. Likewise, in the Middle East the U.S is so intensely involved- militarily as well as in terms of its participation in the negotiations about conflict and security- that the 'outside' state has become for all intents and purposes region's dominant power.

Finally, the assumption of how a conflict intra or inter state becomes a regional conflict has been central to our essay, in order to try to identify how an intra or an inter-state conflict, either multilateral or bilateral affect the security of an entire region or sub-region. In other words, how a conflict could become regionalized. In general that could happen:

1. Due to the involvement of neighboring states. Examples: Refugees, Drugs.
2. Threaten the interests of states, powers (regional or global) because:
 - Endangers nationals
 - Changing patterns of alliance relationships: (Threaten political or ideological allies, or active alliance commitments)
 - Disrupt access to strategic resources: Example oil
 - Threaten to disrupt political stability in strategically important areas and as consequences affects regional stability.

THE ARAB- ISRAELI CONFLICT

Nayef Abu Khalaf

One can trace the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict back to the second half of the Nineteenth Century. The conflict was caused by the interaction of four major factors: the growing interests of the colonial powers at the time; the increasing weakness of the Ottoman Empire; the rising of Arab nationalism; and the emergence of the Zionist movement.

In 1948 Israel was established, and the first Arab–Israeli war broke out in the days that followed. Since then, four major wars between Israel and neighboring Arab states took place. The PLO was created in 1964, and it has become a major actor in the military and political scene.

The Arab–Israeli conflict has been the major threat to the security and economic development of the nations in the region. The danger of confrontation between the two super powers, the eruption of oil supplies, and the use of oil as a political weapon, the refugee issue, the human aspect of the long suffering, all had been manifestations of the complexity of the conflict.

The International Community had expressed great concerns over the need for reaching a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The absence of such a settlement is seen as a major threat to the stability and security, not only to the Middle East Region but to the whole world as well. The Middle East conflict had prevented over the years the development of closer relations between the West and friendly Arab governments. It had also been a major source of conflict in the Atlantic relations between Europe and the United States.

The end of the Cold War had led to changes in the perceptions of the parties to the conflict, as to the nature of the regional security in the Middle East. This essay will view the changes in the perceptions of the major parties: The United States, the European Union, Israel, and the Arab World, Particularly Syria, Jordan, and the PLO, which have been deeply involved in the conflict since its inception.

The USA has stated its new fears regarding regional security. It perceives the threat is coming from two main sources: first, the proliferation and development of mass-destruction weapons, including nuclear weapons; second the potential danger of the so-called International *Terrorism*. In order to secure international legitimacy to achieve the above two goals, the U.S was deeply involved in the U.N Security Council Summit Declaration on 31 January 1992.

The policies of the European Union towards regional security in the Middle East had also gone through dramatic changes, particularly in the resort to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy as one of the three pillars of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. In expressing its desire for playing a more active role in the Middle-East peace process, the EU has appointed for the first time, Miguel Moratinos, as a special envoy for the Middle East. The EU has a high strategic stake in a just and lasting peace in

the region. The EU launched a new Euro-Mediterranean” partnership at Barcelona⁵ in 1995.

The notion of security has always been a central theme in Israel’s perception of the Middle East conflict. This is continually evident in clamor for, and popularity of, army generals within the political system. Retaining control of territory is, for many Israelis, the most tangible means by which security is achieved, maintaining strong and defensible boundaries, is a traditional territorial concept of security.⁶ However, other Israelis believe that territory no longer has a major role to play in the modern era of warfare and security doctrine. In his book on the ”New Middle East”, Shimon Peres Argues that in an age of ballistic missiles which can fly over distances of hundreds of kilometers, regional security can never be simply a territorial issue.

As for the Arab Nations, Israel is always looked upon as a security threat, whose intentions are to continue its goals of territorial expansionism resulting in occupation of Arab land and the creation of more refugees. Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank as well as its daily attacks in Southern Lebanon serves to highlight Arab fears.⁷

In order to adapt to the changing international system, in the post Cold War era, certain Arab countries, who had close ties with the USSR, were forced to alter their domestic and foreign policies. Syria, for example, joined the American-led wartime coalition against Iraq, and thus forced a change in the West’s long perception of Syria as “radical” state. Syria established full diplomatic relations with Egypt, and worked at improving its relations with Arab Gulf-States, particularly Saudi Arabia, and softened its position towards the principles governing a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁸

Jordan, on its part, was the first Arab state to perceive the dangers coming from Israel’s hard-liners who had repeatedly stated that Jordan is the homeland for the Palestinians, The Palestinian uprising (Intifada) made it possible for the late King Hussien Of Jordan to take a historic step in the summer of 1988 when he declared the dismantling of the legal and administrative links between Jordan and the West Bank . To affirm the Palestinian identity in all its aspects, the king said: “ *Jordan is not Palestine , and the independent Palestinian State will be established on the occupied Palestinian land after its liberation.*”⁶ However , the absence of the former King could only mean that the Jordan’s new agenda for peace and security can be achieved through the restoration of the relations with the Arab countries , in particular the Gulf States. Peace with Israel doesn’t constitute a top priority for the new King Abdullah.

⁵ The Barcelona conference approved an ambitious progame: Political and Security Co-operation in the Mediaterranian Region which would include human rights, democratic norms, pluralism, territorial integrity, combating terrorism and organised crime, cultural and religious dialogue.

Peter Schlotten, Free Trade and Democratization= Development,? The EU Mediterranean policy . Peace Research institute of Frankfurt, Report No. 52. April 1999.

⁶ David Newman, ”Israeli Security : Reality and Myth”, *Palestine- Israel Journal* , [http:// www.pij.org/current/p.17.html](http://www.pij.org/current/p.17.html).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Taher Shad ,et al , Syrian Foreign Policy In The Post-Soviet Era, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.17, No.1 and 2, Winter and Spring 1995. pp.77-79.

⁶ Address of his Majesty King Hussien of Jordan to the Nation on 31 July 1988 .

As for the PLO , changes in its policy were a reflection of internal and external dynamics ,The *Intifadah* led to the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in the 19 th. emergency Session of the Palestine National Council held in Algiers , 15 November 1988 . The PNC accepted the principle of peaceful settlement based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, which would allow the establishment of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza alongside Israel. This pragmatic approach opened the way for dialogue between the PLO and the USA , as well as the upgrading of the PLO's representation status in the member states of the European Community. The end of the Cold War , and the Gulf War in the early 1990s were tow factors that forced another changes in the PLO's position regarding the Middle East peace process started in Madrid by the end of 1991 .

There is a common view among all the parties to the Arab Israeli conflict , whether those who are directly or indirectly involved , that regional security is closely linked to progress in the peace process . Thus , the Middle East stands at a crossroad . The formal Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel , signed in 1979, had failed in terms of the development of normal relations between the tow sides . Relations between Jordan and Israel are also linked to Israel's implementation of the interim agreement with the Palestinians . The later had come to a complete halt since Natenyahu came to power in 1996. Nonetheless, the results of the recent Israeli election on 17 May 1999, give grate hope for the future .

Further progress in the Middle East peace process would create a suitable political climate for consideration of a regional security regime that would address the many security concerns of the region⁷ , and would help in forcing changes in the traditional notion of regional security , This will pave the way towards building regional security order that is open to all the states of the region , in order to achieve peace and security for all .

⁷ Peter Jones , ” Towards a Regional Security Regime for the Middle East : Issues and Options ”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) , December 1998 .

THE U.S-CUBAN CONFLICT: INDEPENDENCE VS DOMINATION

Author: Soraya Castro Marino

What North Americans Commonly refer to as the 1898 Spanish- American War- when the United States fought against Spain for three month in Cuba and in the Philippines- is to Cubans and Filipinos an episode in their respective wars of independence against Spain. The seemingly insignificant difference in names reflects a deeper tendency in the United States over the last century to see Cuba and Cuban events as an extension of the United States and U.S. interests.⁹ (Zanetti: 1998, pp. 8-14) Cuba was a colony of Spain until 1898.¹⁰ However, even before independence, the United States had begun to replace Spain as a dominant force in Cuban economic affairs. (Foner: 1977, pp. 4-5)

Interest in developing markets in China and plans for a canal through Central America were two of the main aims of the new powerful power. (Fuentes Mares: 1984, p 17) In this sense, the Caribbean was a region with a strong economic relationship to the U.S., and had long been regarded by many as a natural extension of U.S. Republic.

In the end, U.S. goals were overwhelmingly achieved. The Caribbean was "secured", allowing for construction of the Panama Canal. In Asia, shipping routes and military facilities were established. The U.S. finally became an international player and the Monroe Doctrine with all its corollaries was definitely set.¹¹

If economic dependence on the United States firmly closed the lid over the coffin of Cuban independence, the hinges of the lid were attached in 1901. By 1902, the Cubans were forced to accept the Platt Amendment in the first Cuban Constitution as the only alternative to remaining under direct U.S. military rule. Among other things, it gave the U.S. the unconditional right to intervene in Cuba's internal affairs and also required Cuba to sell or lease to the United States land for naval bases, which still one exists today as Guantanamo Naval Base.¹²

⁹ At various times in the nineteenth century, the idea of annexing Cuba by different means, included buying the Island was raised in the United States. That was an old desire declared by President Thomas Jefferson on November 1805. On April 19, 1898, the U.S. Congress passed a joint resolution proclaiming Cuba "free and independent", and when signed by McKinley the next day amounted to a declaration of war. In June 17.000 U.S. troops joined in the Cuban struggle for independence.

¹⁰ By July 1898 the United States claimed credit for the victory over Spain and promptly installed a military government to oversee affairs without the recognition of the Cuban Army or the Cuban Government in arms.

¹¹ The United States attempted to assert its power with the "Monroe Doctrine", promulgated by President James Monroe in 1823. Originally aimed at czarist Russia's possible claims to the American Northwest, the doctrine became better know for its challenge to an apparent design of the European Holy Alliance to help Spain reconquer its former colonies. Further strictures warned the Europeans against using indirect means to extend their political power in the New World. As later put in a popular slogan, the basic message was clear: "American for the Americans". Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed in 1904 that chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of society, may require intervention by some civilized nations. In the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States in cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

¹² Introduced by Senator Orville Platt and approved by the U.S. Congress as part of an army appropriation bill, the amendment limited Cuban sovereignty by stipulating that the United States could intervene in all Cuban affairs, domestic or foreign, solely at U.S. discretion.

Under these broad terms, the United States did send troops to Cuba several times in the next 32 years to stabilize situations that threatened U.S. property. One of those interventions lasted a period of three years (1906-1909), during which time U.S. troops served as an occupation force with a military governor. More importantly, the threat of intervention gave the United States de facto control over internal affairs of the country.

Historian Jules Benjamin has argued that U.S. military occupation contributed to the transformation of Cuba from the status of Spanish colony to that of an U.S. quasi colony. (Benjamin: 1977, pp. 30-62) Cuban national pride is fierce, and for Hundred years the United States undermined, disparaged, and ignored Cuban sovereignty. Cuba experienced the full brunt of the treatment because in many ways it was “the pearl of the Antilles” in the U.S. imperial crowns for the first half of the twentieth century.

From 1934 to 1958 Cuba was favored locale for U.S. investors and tourists, and the two countries maintained a special relationship that worked largely to the benefit of the United States.¹³ This relationship was destroyed by 1959 revolution.

The conflict relations that have prevailed between the two countries began in 1898. Without any doubt, 1959 was an inflection point in US-Cuba Relations, but its roots are in 1898. The essence of this conflict between Cuba and the United States then and now is Independence Vs Domination.¹⁴

Talking about 1959 as an inflection point in US-Cuba Relations, the Eisenhower Administration's Policy toward Cuba emanated from several sources.¹⁵ First, the prior relationship with Cuba, in which the United States had dominated Cuban politics, led Washington officials to resent and distrust a government they could not control. Officials also saw the revolution from the perspective of corporations, which bemoaned the loss of a treasure from which they had reaped great profits. Companies that suffered losses in Cuba due to expropriation and nationalization processes pressured the U.S. Government to redress their damages.

Indeed, the rigid anticommunist ideological framework that dominated the U.S. Foreign Policy debate ultimately shaped policy toward Cuba. It forced policymakers to misconstrue a national revolution as a marker in the East-West struggle.

The proclamation of the socialist character of the Cuban Revolution took place only during the prelude of the Bay of Pigs' (Playa Giron) invasion on April 16, 1961. U.S. Government broke diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba on January 1961. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion marked a watershed in U.S.-Cuban relations. Washington's most obvious strategy had failed. The issue shifted to the level of superpowers. By October 1962 the soviets were installing intermediate-range rocket bases in Cuba, with the approval of the Cuban Government. This was an

¹³ The concentration of Cuban trading with the United States was especially intense between 1954 and 1958. On average, export from Cuba to its northern neighbor represented 65 percent of its total exports, while imports from the United States totaled 74 percent of its purchases from abroad.

¹⁴ A Cuban popular wisdom of distrust toward the United States is like a trademark of that Republic that was born under U.S. occupation and conditions. The feeling in other words was frustration, humiliation and distrust.

¹⁵ In March 1960, President Eisenhower concluded that it would be impossible to reach a positive agreement with the government of Fidel Castro.

unprecedented challenge to the balance of military power. The World seemed to balance on the edge of nuclear war. The superpower confrontation in the Caribbean had fateful implications for Cuba. First, Fidel Castro himself was not consulted at any stage. The result was to make Cuba, in Latin American eyes, into a soviet satellite in essential security matters. Second, the Soviets withdrew their missiles only because Washington (secretly) promised it would not invade Cuba. This was the least noticed and least understood result of the missile crisis: the Soviets forced the United States to allow the socialist experiment in Cuba to proceed. (Blight 1994, pp. 56-83)

In spite of the differences that every period had in the non-existing U.S.-Cuban Relations during all those 39 long years, the East-West confrontation was the main basis of them until 1989-1991.

The breakdown of the bipolar system of international relations disengaged Cuba from the East-West axis. Consequently, by 1989 perceptions about the Island changed and for the first time since the Missile Crisis of 1962, most US officials recognized that Cuba was not a threat to U.S. national security.¹⁶

The end of the Cold War placed the United States in the position of redefining its national security priorities. Concerns and objectives that once shaped U.S. policy towards Cuba have been overtaken by history.¹⁷ The main goals of U.S. policy towards the Island during the 1980's have been accomplished.¹⁸ Cuban troops withdrew from Africa in 1989, by early 1992 Cuba ceased its involvement in Latin American revolution. Its military alliance with the former Soviet Union has withered away into insignificance. Still, despite the end of the Cold War, U.S. Cuba policy remains an anachronistic remnant of that period.

Under the current Administration of President William J. Clinton a climate of crisis permeates the decision-making process.¹⁹ Nevertheless, during non-crisis interludes, a whole new range of actors and interest groups have come to influence U.S. policy towards the Island. They are advising improved economics and diplomatic relations.²⁰ These include non-governmental organizations and private voluntary organizations with an interest in sending humanitarian aid to the Island, 'Think tanks', business

¹⁶ The best example seems to be the Defense Department Report: The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security, which went public on March 20, 1998. The Defense Department states that Cuba poses no significant threat to U.S. national security.

¹⁷ The disappearance of the Soviet Union had a critical impact on Cuba. The island had to undertake an economic restructuring to be able to face internal challenges brought about by changes in international relations.

¹⁸ In 1991-1994 Cuba underwent a painful reality check, as the foreign underpinning of its economy vanished. The collapse of the USRR and of the COMECON brutally exposed Cuba's economic vulnerability. General economic activity fell by 29% between 1989-1993. The reforms of the 1990s introduce or gave an altogether new importance to other forms of properties, including joint ventures with foreign capital, cooperatives and small-scale private property. The redefinition of the role of the state, along with the ongoing process of social differentiation, have markedly changed the constellation of social actors in Cuba and have posed a potential challenge to the traditional mechanisms for generating and preserving acceptable levels of consent. The chances for internal conflict in Cuba increase.

¹⁹ The decision taken by the Cuban government to shoot down two aircraft of the Brothers to the Rescue group on February 24 has significant relevance for the security of both the United States and Cuba, and for the entire Caribbean region. Later, in October 1996, a leak to The Miami Herald would let it be known that Clinton, at the time, requested the Pentagon to provide possible response options, namely: A mass air strike, or a missile attack against the San Antonio military base where the MIGs had taken off. See: The Independent, October 2, 1996.

²⁰ The Pope's visit underlines the failure of U.S. policy towards the island. The Pope criticized the U.S. blockade during his January 21-25 trip. All of Latin America condemns the U.S. policy. European allies of the U.S. refuse to go along, and Canada goes out of its way to defeat U.S. efforts to cut off all contact between Cuba and the outside world.

groups, environmental organizations, and public health groups as well as a diverse representation of Cuban-Americans.²¹ None-the-less, U.S. policy towards Cuba tends to look to the more familiar patterns of hostility and confrontation promoted by conservative constituencies among the Cuban-Americans.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, in practice, domestic politics drives U.S. policy towards Cuba. The Executive branches, first the Bush and then the Clinton Administration, interested in other strategic and security issues, did not pay attention to Cuba. Meanwhile a group of legislators, backed by the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF), the fiercest anti-Cuban lobbies group, forced the debate on the Cuban problem. Moreover, they turned the issue into a domestic one by fictitiously linking the electoral vote in Florida and New Jersey with Cuba-U.S. relations.

The perception that the Cuba's internal situation was a time bomb where the "economic crisis and the illegitimacy of a pre-industrial, antiquated political and economic system" would not withstand the thrust of history prevailed. At the same time, the lack of an articulate strategy with respect to Cuba, stating future steps beyond circumstantial events helped certain special interest groups monopolize the Cuban issue. They used the United States' political process and the congressional electoral logic to serve their own interests.²²

The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, known as Torricelli Act, was therefore designed to intensify the economic blockade and bring more pressure to bear on the Island.²³ Eventually, it became the formula to force the debate on Cuba in electoral periods, as evidenced by the passing of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, commonly referred to as Helms-Burton Act.²⁴

²¹ The balance of power in U.S. politics is beginning to shift away from Cuban American hard-liners. There is an important U.S. trend: the erosion of conservative support for U.S. Cuba policy. By September 1998, former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Eagleburger, citing a need for "an objective analysis" of U.S. policy towards Cuba, were urging President Clinton to authorize the creation of a bipartisan commission. Eagleburger sent a supporting letter to Senator John Warner (R-Va.) who told Clinton on October 13, 1998 that a comprehensive study of Cuba policy was needed because there has been none since 1960 when the United States first began restricting trade ties with Cuba.

On January 5, 1999, in a politically cautious move, President Clinton announced that the Administration rejected the proposal to constitute a bipartisan commission. The three Cuban-American representatives, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Lincoln Diaz Balart and Robert Menendez as well as Senators Robert Torricelli and Bob Graham immediately began to lobby against the proposed bipartisan Committee. They called it "The Gore Commission" in an attempt to put the possible future democratic candidate for the 2000 presidential election under pressure.

²² The most extreme example was the approval of the Helms-Burton Act. It is quite faithful to the theme of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. In the Monroe Doctrine, the United States asserted its right to specify which system of government was acceptable in the Americas. In the Roosevelt corollary, the U. S. Government claimed the additional right to stipulate specific economic and other policies and specifically to redress the nonpayment of debts. The Helms-Burton Act claims for the United States the unilateral right to decide a wide array of domestic policies an arrangement in a nominally sovereign post Castro Cuba. It rediscovers the ideological brio of Imperialism. At the end of the twentieth century, as in centuries past, the United States is demanding the right to set the framework for the political and economic system it would tolerate inside Cuba.

²³ The Torricelli Act reinforced the objective of putting an end to the Cuban revolutionary process given the precarious economic situation prevailing in the island. It tightened the blockade to the point of prohibiting American subsidiaries in third countries from trading with Cuba. According to Richard Nuccio, then advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Cuban Affairs, "the U.S. government's policy toward Cuba focused around the most complete economic embargo being enforced by the United States against any country of the world". See: *Washington Times*, July 30, 1995, p 1A.

²⁴ On March 12, 1996, the President's signature marked the entry into force of the Helms-Burton Act. On the same day, coincidentally, the Republican primary election was held in the state of Florida. The Helms-Burton Act labels and defines U.S. policy toward Cuba and is strict enough to leave very little room for the Administration to apply other policy instruments in the short term.

Although the policy towards Cuba means relatively little to those in the U.S., its implications for those on the Island are enormous. Within Cuba, every nuance and component of U.S. policy carries with it a profound consequence for a variety of different domestic constituencies. On the Island, U.S. politics constitute a major determinant of the conduct of both foreign and domestic policy, while for the United States, the Cuban case has little impact on foreign policy priorities of the current “New World Disorder”.

Cutting the Gordian knot not only requires political courage by the Cuban Government and the U.S. Government but also a new, realistic framework to be applied in order to achieve a more stable region in the Caribbean.

Both Governments should transform their rigid ideological and personalized positions to issue of common interests, that involves migration²⁵, drugs’ interdiction, control of diseases, environmental issues, including the safety of present and future nuclear plants in both countries.²⁶ Those are concerned themes for both governments and the Caribbean, and are part of the security agenda in the region. Those issues could help to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence that will lead to deal in a step by step process with a range of complex bilateral and regional issues such as the resolution of property claims; the status of the U.S. military base at Guantánamo Bay; the implications for the Western Hemisphere of the restoration of a Cuban sugar quota; the impact on the Caribbean economy of resuming normal bilateral trade relations; Cuban participation in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA); prospects for Cuba’s re-entry into the Organization of American States (OAS); and the integration of Cuba into the international financial system.

Still, “Old warriors die hard”

²⁵ A good example could be the migratory agreements signed by the two governments. The migratory accords signed by the governments of Cuba and the United States after the rafters' crisis of the summer of 1994 settled security and humanitarian concerns. By virtue of the 1994 and 1995 agreements, the U.S. treatment of the Republic of Cuba in migratory affairs returned to normal for the first time since 1959. They placed migratory relations with the island almost on the same level and under the same regulations that the U.S. applies to any other country of the world.

²⁶ The Helms-Burton Law declares that any resumption of efforts to make operational the nuclear facility at Cienfuegos, or any illegal massive wave of Cubans should be considered a national security threat to the United States. According to the U.S. law, the President has to take appropriate measures to stop both of them, including the use of military actions.

THE PHILIPPINES-CHINA CONFLICT

Angelie C. Agustin

The Spratlys group consists of some 230 islets, reefs and keys. Located in the southern part of South China Sea, it covers an area of some 250,000 square kilometers. The archipelago is uninhabited and most islets are too small to support human occupation. For most of the 1950's, however, the islets were usually regarded as nothing more than a navigation hazard. No state established uncontested ownership of the area.

All that changed in the late 1970's when geologists estimated that the Spratlys contain reserves of oil and natural gas, which in one estimate are valued at 1 trillion dollars. Suddenly, the sovereignty of some, or all, of the island was disputed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines.¹

China, Taiwan and Vietnam all claimed ownership of the whole archipelago based on historical claims. On the other hand, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines claimed only some of the islands based on geographic proximity. They claimed the isles that lie adjacent to, or on, were continental shelves.

In 1988, there were brief clashes between China and Vietnam that resulted to the sinking of three Vietnamese gunboats. Between 1989 and 1991, the claimant States slowly consolidated their occupation of the islands, building barracks and landing strips.

In 1992, an agreement called Manila Declaration was signed in which the claimant States agreed to settle their disputes through dialogue, not to use force to pursue their claims, to jointly exploit the islands' resources and not to appropriate any more islands. In the same year and despite the 1992 agreement, however, China occupied two more islands.

In February 1995, the Philippines protested China's construction of steel and concrete structures, as well as the stationing of warships, in the Mischief Reef, one of the reefs claimed by the Philippines. Mischief Reef lies well within the Philippines' claim and is only 135 nautical miles from the Philippines' baseline. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of which both China and the Philippines are signatories, coastal States are given sovereign rights over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which is 200 nautical miles from their baselines. In terms of distance, the Philippines is the closest among the claimant States to the Spratlys. This group of islands and reefs is 650 kilometers from Vietnam's coasts. It is even farther from China's southernmost Hainan Island, which is 1,000 kilometers away. It is 250 kilometers from Malaysia's Sabah coast. But it is only 100 kilometers west of the Philippines. China, however, ignored the Philippines' protests over its incursion in Philippine territory.²

¹ "Regional bully having its way," Today, 25 March 1999

² Malou Talosig, "China, RP Clash anew on Spratlys," Today, 17 April 1999

The Philippines gained the support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a group. China's actions were viewed as undermining the stability of the Asia-Pacific Region. ASEAN countries responded by raising the issue at international forums. The conflict between China and the Philippines has become a concern, not only of the Philippines, but also of the other countries and territories in East Asia, as well as those countries with strategic interests in the region.

Any war to occupy the Spratly Islands would seriously jolt regional stability in Southeast Asia. It is therefore understandable that the ASEAN tend to the view that Spratlys could be a flash point for destabilizing Southeast Asia if left unresolved. It is interesting that Vietnam, which still controls the largest area of the territory in the Spratlys, does not put any preconditions before its preparedness to undertake negotiation to settle its claims. It is in favor of a negotiated settlement and has supported the efforts of the ASEAN and Indonesia to mediate. On other hand, Malaysia and the Philippines also support a regional response to conflict resolution. China, however, insists on its sovereignty in the South China Sea region, and will abide by a solution, which may be negotiated only under that condition. That is the prerogative of the strong.³

Most of the countries in the region are concerned about the rising power and the military presence of China in the area. China's presence is not only motivated by its desire to control the abundant sea resources in the area, but also as part of its grand development strategy. Through its presence in the South China Sea, particularly in the Spratlys, China intends to become a legitimate power in Southeast Asia, and probably regard it as a sphere of influence.

The United States once provided the Philippines a security umbrella against external threats through its two largest overseas bases (Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base) situated in the northern part of the Philippines. This allowed the Philippines to concentrate its efforts on combating internal security problems, such as communist insurgencies and separatist movements.⁴ In the aftermath of the Cold War and the departure of the United States' military bases, however, the Philippines was left the task of modernizing its Armed Forces. Fears that the withdrawal of the Americans would leave the Philippines vulnerable to external threats were echoed. The serious national security threat posed by China's escalation of its military presence in the Mischief Reef provided for an increased level of security concern in the Philippines. In less than a month, China has transformed the Reef, from what it still claims as a sanctuary for fishermen, into a small naval base that may soon be capable of interdicting and controlling shipping, communication and other economic activities in the South China Sea.⁵

Hence, the disputes over the Spratlys are very legally complicated but their peaceful resolution should be a matter of serious concern for the international community. However, States often refuse to become involved in issues of no immediate importance to them, particularly when a powerful and rising State, like China, is

³ Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat, *Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea* (Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), pg. 217

⁴ Ian James Storey, "Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Volume 21, Number 1, April 1999

⁵ Ruben Carranza, "A sober look at Mischief Reef," *Today*, 18 November 1998

involved. The Southeast Asia States are keen to resolve the Spratly's dispute through regional consensus and regional understanding. The People's Republic of China appears to have no such concern or to see the case for urgency and, as the largest, fastest growing and most powerful State in the region, may well believe that time is on its side.

REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT: RESHAPING THE SUB REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX IN SOUTH AMERICA

Catalina Rojas

Origins of the internal conflict

Historically speaking, the precarious process of state building in Colombia has been characterized for its geographical and economical fragmentation –expressed in the absence of an internal market and commercial segmentation among regions²⁷-. The political exclusion and struggle of the two ideological national projects: the Conservatives and Liberals were expressed by a series of civil wars and constitutions during the nineteenth century. This type of violence can be traced until the first half of the twentieth century and is known as the *bureaucratic violence inside the system*.

In the intent of establishing a link of this type of violence and the origins of the guerrilla warfare²⁸ in Colombia one can say that the unvarying element is the use of violence as legitimate mean to face the political exclusion. Within that context, the guerrilla warfare from its remote origins date from the peasant self – defense struggle of the 1920's and 30's until the second half of the twenty century has to be explained as *ideological violence against the system*.

The current scenario, since the second half of the eighties, is challenged by a changing pattern of the dynamics of the internal conflict. In addition to the crisis of the political system and bureaucratic corruption, the Colombian state is facing multiple armed challengers, shifting from a bipolar to a multipolar conflict: guerrillas, paramilitaries, drug traffickers²⁹. Consequently, the reshaping of the armed conflict present two major trends: Firstly, the dramatic erosion of the Colombian state due to multiple assaults on its sovereignty (control and dispute of territory by guerrillas, drug cartels, and paramilitaries), resulting as the privatization of violence, justice and taxation in those localities. Secondly, the regional implications that the internal conflict, with this multiplicity of variables and sources of violence is having towards the sub region.

Regional implications of the internal conflict

According to some analysts³⁰, both, the future of the Colombian internal conflict and its resolution will suffer a big impact in the international and even more directly in the regional scenario. The main actors in the regional scope regarding the Colombian armed conflict are the U.S and Venezuela, but also Panama and Ecuador play a meaningful role.

²⁷ Leal Buitrago, Francisco. "Estado y Política en Colombia". 2da Edición. Bogotá. Edit. Siglo XXI, 1987.

²⁸ "Armed struggle became part of a broader political strategy to capture state power. It was in this context that the FARC emerged in 1964". Vargas Meza Ricardo. "The FARC, the war and the crisis of the state". In: NACLA. Vol XXXI, No. 5, March/April 1998. In this paper the term guerrilla is used strictly for the study of the major guerrilla group: FARC "Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces".

²⁹ Chernick Marc "Peacemaking and violence in Latina America". In International Dimension of Intrastate conflicts". Brown, Michael (ed) 1996, MIT Press., Page 300.

³⁰ See for example, Rangel Alfredo. "Colombia: guerra en el fin de siglo"., Bogotá ,Ediciones Uniandes, 1998, 193 pages.

US vision of the Drug problem

For the U. S current foreign policy it is much important to deal with a government labeled as being financed by drug cartels³¹ and a highly criticized National Army by its violations of Humans Rights that the *non-hurtful and geo-strategic* Marxist ideology praised by the Colombian guerrillas. “This is due to the shift in the priority of the U.S International Agenda, from the combat to communism to the drug struggle and humans rights defense”. (Rangel:1998, 135).³²

The State Department and the DEA insists that the drug traffic origin is placed in the supply process, however, they have denied the thesis that explained the current guerrilla as another drug cartel. The military aid against the drug trafficking are conditioned to the respect of Human Rights by the National Army, but the main aid is focus to the Police not to the Army, which is the one holding the combat against the guerrilla groups. The government of the United States³³ has officially expressed its concerned towards the regional dimensions that the Colombian conflict is having in terms of security threat.

The situation with Venezuela

Venezuela faces two security problems that are constantly under the pressure of the public opinion towards its resolution. The first one is the enlarging of the criminal acts in Caracas, and secondly the Colombian guerrilla actions in the frontier. According to Rangel, the Venezuelan government has appealed to all kind of diplomatic resources to the Colombian government with no results.

Ernesto Samper denied the strategy titled “Hot Pursue”, meaning the extermination of the insurgencies, proposed by the former president of Venezuela, Rafael Caldera. Consequently, he appealed to the U.S, in the process of a possible bilateral dialogue with the guerrilla forces. According to the FARC (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces) they have been having such conversations some time before. Eventually, a non – aggression agreement between Venezuela and the guerrilla would a first step in the political involvement of the U.S in the solution of its violent process and also the two main concerns in the Post – Cold war agenda: the supply narcotic problem and the Human Rights Issue. (Rangel: 1998)

U.S participation in the Colombian internal conflict: Venezuela, Ecuador & Panama sub-regional complex

³¹ As was the case with the former administration by Ernesto Samper (1994-1998)

³² All the translations from Spanish to English are made by the author of this paper.

³³ “The Department of State warns U.S citizens against unnecessary travel to Colombia. Violence by narcotraffickers, guerrillas, paramilitary groups and other criminal elements continues to affect all parts of the country. Citizens of the U.S and other countries have been the victims of recent threats, kidnappings and murders. After being kidnapped in Colombia, three U.S citizens were murdered in March 1999, and their bodies were recovered in Venezuela. Colombian groups have been known to operate in the border areas of neighboring countries, creating similar dangers for travelers in those areas”. Source: Department of State’s latest Consular Information Sheet for Colombia.

[www:http://travel.state.gov/colombia_warning.html](http://travel.state.gov/colombia_warning.html)

As a result of the spread of the internal conflict in the neighbor countries, Colombia becomes the center of the sub-regional concern of the U.S (Rangel: 1998,139). In a testimony to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Senate, March 31 1998, General - Charles Wilhem, South Chief Commander of the U.S, qualified Colombia “as the country facing the major threat as for the South Command concerns”.³⁴

One has to consider that Venezuela³⁵ is the major external oil provider to the U.S and so there is an interest of that government for a secure frontier. Thus, the proposal of combating the guerrillas in the Colombian territory by Venezuelan army is always in the table.

Ecuador is also a key place due to its closeness to the southern jungle³⁶ where drug dealers and guerrilla have a tactical alliance. The black market of arms, explosives enter throughout this border. The FARC also controls some zones of the Panama frontier, whereby arms from the black market of Central America enter. Moreover, the struggle among paramilitaries and guerrillas has provoked displaced Colombian population, whose capture and deportation has caused several incidents among the two countries. As with Venezuela, the U.S has insisted on the idea to reinforce the Panama border, notion that is supported also for the U.S Military bases they have and the canal management they will control until the end of this year.

In sum, Colombia is now perceived as an instability source and insecurity exporter to the sub region. Furthermore, the internal conflict overlaps the major topics of the U.S agenda to Colombia: drug traffic, human rights, democracy and environment. Its participation can oscillate between political-diplomatic support and military, conditioned to the human rights issue and a severe internal reform. As a result of the information aforementioned, the Colombian conflict is no longer a domestic affair. Its re-solution³⁷, including the circuit of the topics of drug-trafficking, internal displaced population, arms trade, and paramilitaries necessarily requires an international, most specific a regional solution.

³⁴ Human Rights Watch. “The rol of International Community”.

[Http://www.hrw.org/hrw/spanish/reports/colombia/Colsp989-09.html](http://www.hrw.org/hrw/spanish/reports/colombia/Colsp989-09.html)

³⁵ In the last ten years the Colombian guerrilla have attacked seventy (70) times Venezuelan Military bases, causing death to a considerable number of National Guards and Venezuelan Marines. The guerrillas have also kidnapped cattle and landowners, stole vehicles and small airplanes. As a result the Ministry of Defense in Venezuela asked for \$ US 417 millions to reinforce their aircraft supplies in order to defeat the insurgents. In addition to they have twelve thousand men in three military bases protecting the border, plus U.S advisory to this respect. Quoted from the “Cambio 16” Magazine. No. 255, May 4 1988, Bogota, Colombia, page 28.

³⁶ The Parallel State or Empty Spaces defined as areas where others different from the Colombian State manage the monopoly of force, justice and taxation.

³⁷ For additional information regarding the international involvement in former Peace Process see: Valenzuela, Pedro. Papel Político, No. 8, Octubre de 1998 (7 – 34).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ayoob Mohammed: The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995)
- Barkey, Henry J., “ Turkish Kurdey’s Kurdish Dilemma,” In: Survival, Vol.35. No. 4, (Winter 1993-1994)
- Benjamin, Jules Robert: The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880-1934. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977)
- Blight, James: Cuba on the Brink. (Pittsburgh University Press, 1994)
- Buzan, Barry: People, states and Fear: An agenda for International Security Studies in The Post-Cold War Era. (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991)
- Catley Bob and Keliat Makmur, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea (Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997, p. 217)
- Chernick Marc “Peacemaking and Violence in Latina America”. In International Dimension of Intrastate conflicts. (Brown, Michael (ed) MIT Press, 1996)
- Entessar, Nader, Kurdish Ethnonationalism (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992)
- Foner, Phillip: A History of Cuba and its Relations with the United States. (New York: International Publishing Co.; 1963, Vol. 2 pp. 289-296;
- Benjamin, Jules Robert: The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880-1934. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977)
- Fuentes Mares, José: Génesis del Imperialismo Norteamericano. (México: Colegio de México, 1984, p 17).
- Hannum, Hurst, Autonomy Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990)
- Hurrell, Andrew: “ Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective” In: Louise Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds) Regionalism in World Politics, (Oxford, 1997)
- Jones, Peter: Towards a regional Security for the Middle East: Issues and Options, Stockholm. International Peace Research Institute. December 1998.
- Kanet, Roger E.: Resolving Regional Conflicts, University of Illinois Press, 1998.
- Kaufman, Stuart J.: “The Fragmentation and Consolidation of International System” , In: International Organisation, 1997, Vol 51, No 2 (Spring)
- Kirsci, Kemal and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict (London and Portland, Ore: Frank Cass, 1997)
- Leal Buitrago, Francisco, Estado y Política en Colombia. 2da Edición. (Bogotá: Edit. Siglo XXI, 1987)
- Mann, Michael: “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origin, Mechanisms and Results”, In: John A. Hall (ed), State in History, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986)
- McDowall, David, A Modern History of the Kurds, (London, 1995)
- Mohapatra, Aswini, “ Kurdish Ethnon-nationalism”, World Focus, Vol.13, No3, 1994 (New Delhi)
- Morgan, Patrick M.: Regional Conflicts: Some Preliminary Considerations, UC Irvine /1995/
- Newman David: “Israel Security Reality and Myth”, In: Palestine-Israel Journal, <http://www.pij.org/current/html>

- Olson, Robert, 'The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1992
- Peter Schlotten: Free Trade and Democratization=Development, The EU Mediterranean policy. Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt, Report No. 52. April 1999.
- Poku Nana and Graham, David (eds): Redefining Security: Population Movements and National Security, Praeger, Westport Connecticut, London, 1998.
- Rangel Alfredo: Colombia: guerra en el fin de siglo, (Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, 1998)
- Shad, Taher, et al: Syrian Foreign Policy In The Post-Soviet Era, In: Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.17, No.1 and 2, Winter and Spring 1995.
- Storey Ian James, Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 21, Number 1, April 1999
- Valenzuela, Pedro. Papel Político, No. 8, Octubre de 1998
- Vayrynen, Raimo: "Economic and Military Position of Regional Power Centers", In: Journal of Peace Research, 1984, Vol. 16, No 4.
- Zanetti Lecuona, Oscar: "Observaciones en Torno a las Raíces Economicas del '98"; In: Conflicto Cuba-EEUU: A 100 Anos de Historia. Analisis de coyuntura. AUNA, Año2, No 4, Abril 1998, Ciudad de la Habana.